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Abstract
We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of ven-
ture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data
from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of stag-
ing (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and mixes). Thereby, contract
completeness reduces when going from pure milestone financing via mixes to pure
round financing. We show that the decision for a specific form of staging is deter-
mined by the expected distribution of bargaining power between the contracting
parties when new funding becomes necessary and the predictability of the develop-
ment process. To be more precise, parties choose the more complete contracts the
lower the entrepreneur’s expected bargaining power - the maximum level depending
on the predictability of the development process.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, young innovative firms have difficulties in obtaining capital. Reasons are the
high risk, the severe asymmetric information issues as well as the various moral hazard
problems that come hand in hand with such an investment. As the venture capital industry
succeeded in developing several mechanisms to cope with the mentioned problems, it has
become essential for the financing of these firms1. In this paper, we look at one major
mechanism: staging.
Staging implies that not all the capital necessary to finance the project is paid out up
front but in several tranches. The exact conditions for these tranches vary. To be more
specific, there exist two different forms: round financing and milestone financing. Round
financing means that every new tranche is negotiated separately when the venture needs
further funding; milestone financing requires that exact contingencies that the firm has
to achieve to obtain new funds are fixed in the initial contract. Therefore, the decision for
one specific mode of staging is also a decision for or against contract completeness which
then determines the impact of renegotiation on future financing conditions.
Against this background, the aim of the present paper is twofold. First, we examine
the determinants of staging in general. Second, we analyze the contracting parties’ choice
of one specific form of staging. We show that the decision for staging per se is determined
by the degree of uncertainty and asymmetric information whereas the use of a specific
form of staging is determined by the expected distribution of bargaining power between
the contracting parties when new funding becomes necessary and the predictability of the
development process.
To our knowledge, there only exist three important empirical studies on staging. First,
Gompers (1995) [11] looks at the structure of staged investments. He focuses on the de-
terminants of funding size and funding duration for round financing but refrains from
analyzing the determinants for one specific form of staging. The same is true for Ka-
plan and Stro¨mberg (2003) [15] and (2004) [16] who examine the determinants of the
strength of both round and milestone financing separately. In this paper, we go beyond
the existing empirical research by empirically modelling the choice of a specific form of
staging. Thereby, we focus on the impact of renegotiation of future financing conditions
on the initial contract design. We are not aware of other empirical papers testing this
issue. However, Guasch et al. (2003) [13] and Ricard (2005) [22] present studies that focus
on the decision for renegotiation given actual contracts. The former estimate a model of
renegotiation for South-American procurement contracts while the latter considers con-
tract renegotiation in the Spanish movie industry. Thus our approach is complementary
to theirs.
1For a more detailed introduction to venture capital, see for example Gompers and Lerner (1999) [12].
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Moreover, the majority of the growing empirical literature on venture capital, includ-
ing the three previously mentioned studies on staging, is based on US data. Important
exceptions are, for example, Kaplan et al. (2003) [17] whose study is based on a set of 23
countries, as well as Cumming (2002) [8] and Bottazzi et al. (2004) [4] for the European
market. The most important exhaustive study for the German market is the one of Bascha
and Walz (2002) [2] that is based on survey data and analyzes security choice.
Against this background, the paper attempts to further reduce the existing gap of
empirical research for venture capital industries outside the US by using a data set based
on the German market. More importantly, contrary to existing studies about the German
market, the underlying data set exhibits unique characteristics. First, the data set (a
proprietary one from KfW) constitutes a random sample of all VC projects supported
by KfW in Frankfurt, Germany. As KfW is involved in a substantial part of all German
venture capital investments, it is a representative sample of the German venture capital
industry. Second, it covers both boom and bust periods as the data range from 1991 until
2004. Finally, contrary to the majority of empirical studies, the data set is not based on
survey data but the information was directly gathered from the contracts. To be more
precise, it is based on all major documents concerning a specific deal, i.e. the business
plan, the balance sheet, the term sheet, the shareholder’s agreement as well as additional
agreements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical
literature; the third section describes the underlying data set and presents descriptive
statistics that characterize the venture capital industry in Germany. In the fourth section,
we present empirical results. Section five concludes.
2 What does theory tell us?
In this section, we summarize the theoretical literature related to staging proceeding in two
steps: while the different forms of staging - milestone and round financing - are analyzed
in subsection 2.2, in the next subsection, we discuss the determinants of the decision for
staging in general.
2.1 Why do we use staging?
Staging implies that some of the funds deemed necessary for the firm to complete its
project are withheld. This mechanism has three major implications.
First of all, as not all capital is provided up front, staging implicitly gives the investor
the right to decide about the continuation or liquidation of the firm. This exit option
for the investor saves resources because infeasible (negative NPV) projects are identified
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and liquidated early on (see Hellmann (1994) [14]). Obviously, this advantage is the more
pronounced the higher the existing ex ante uncertainty about the profitability of the
project.
Second, in an asymmetric information context, staging can be interpreted as a signaling
mechanism. Staged high quality firms face a low risk of liquidation in comparison with low
quality firms whose liquidation risk is especially high. Thus an entrepreneur with private
information about his firm’s quality is able to use staging as a signal of firm quality.
This issue is modelled by Dessein (2004) [10]. He models how a transfer of control to
the investor serves as a signal of firm quality and congruence of objectives between the
investor and the entrepreneur. Moreover, he shows that investor control is increasing in
the ex ante information asymmetry and in the ex post uncertainty about the project.
One possibility of implementing investor control in this model is by short-term financing.
However, short-term financing can be interpreted as staging. Thus staging is the better,
the higher the degree of asymmetric information ex ante and the more difficult future
monitoring ex post.
Third, staging can act as a commitment device for the entrepreneur not to renegotiate
the initial contract. This effect does not depend on the liquidation risk related to staging
but rather on the fact that injecting less capital at the beginning of the relationship implies
less sunk capital and consequently limited renegotiation possibilities for the entrepreneur.
Neher (1999) [18] precisely models this mechanism. He shows that the entrepreneur cannot
credibly commit to work and not to renegotiate if the venture has no collateral and the
only asset is the entrepreneur’s human capital itself. Furthermore, he points out that the
hold-up problem can be solved by staging as the stepwise provision of capital coincides
with a gradual embodiment of the entrepreneur’s human capital in the firm. Thus staging
should be the more advantageous, the more crucial the entrepreneur’s human capital for
the success of the project and the less tangible the assets.
We summarize these arguments in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 The higher the uncertainty, the higher the degree of asymmetric infor-
mation, the more difficult future monitoring, the more crucial the entrepreneur’s human
capital and the less tangible the firm’s assets, the more probable is staging.
Staging, of course, has also serious shortcomings. First of all, staging may cause de-
lays as entrepreneurs have to commit time to the negotiation process. This lag caused in
implementing the project can induce additional costs such as retardation in the develop-
ment process or in market entry, lost economies of scale or cost overruns. Certainly, these
additional costs have to be outweighed by the benefits of staging. We think, however,
that these costs can be disregarded as they can be minimized by optimally structuring
the negotiation process.
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Second, Cornelli and Yosha (2003) [7] show that the entrepreneur may react to the
prospect of early liquidation with an attempt to manipulate available information. This
phenomenon, called window dressing, reduces the positive effects of staging and tends to
be the more probable the softer the information available. This is exactly the case for
firms for which the benefits of staging are the highest. Thus we cannot control for the
underlying countervailing effects but only for the net effect of staging. This means that
throughout all our tests concerning hypothesis 1, we will have to take into account that
we only measure the net impact of staging.
Finally, staging also changes the entrepreneur’s incentives. This impact is ambiguous:
on the one hand, the liquidation risk increases the entrepreneur’s incentives and, in turn,
the project’s overall probability of success. Wang and Zhou (2002) [23], for example,
show that the termination threat induces the entrepreneur to work harder in order to
ensure further financing by the investor. Therefore, in their model, the effort level of the
entrepreneur is always higher under staged financing. On the other hand, staging induces
opportunistic behavior by the investor. This opportunistic behavior, in turn, reduces the
entrepreneur’s ex ante incentives. The negative incentive effect of staging must therefore be
traded off against the above mentioned positive incentive effect. This trade-off is analyzed
by Rajan (1992) [20], for example, who compares arm’s length financing (i.e. upfront
financing) and insider financing (i.e. staging). However, the extent of the negative effect
crucially depends on the form of staging. Aghion et al. (1994) [1] point out that the under-
investment problem normally related to renegotiation (and therefore to staging) can be
completely overcome by an adequate design of the renegotiation process2. If this is the
case, the net incentive effect can never be negative and its size depends upon the form
of staging. Then incentive effects should not have an influence on the decision of staging
per se but rather on the choice of a specific form of staging as we will show in the next
subsection.
2.2 When do we observe what form of staging?
In the last section, we discussed the advantages and disadvantages of staging per se.
However, some effects of staging, and among these especially the incentive effect for the
entrepreneur, crucially depend on the form of staging which is chosen.
To be more precise, as shown above, there exist two different forms of staging, namely
round financing and milestone financing. With round financing, every new tranche is
2They show that only two conditions must be fulfilled in order to guarantee an efficient outcome: first,
the initial contract must specify a default option in case renegotiation fails and second, it must assign all
the bargaining power to one party. The default option is determined by the initial contract, especially by
the covenants which attribute specific rights to the investor in certain circumstances.
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negotiated separately when the venture needs further funding3. With milestone financing,
the initial contract determines exact contingencies that the firm has to achieve to obtain
new funds. Provided that the milestones are reached, the VC has the contractual obligation
to release the funds to the firm4. Examples for such contingencies are the amount of
revenues realized, the number of patents filed or the development of prototypes. Thus in
this section, we analyze the disadvantages and advantages of these two forms in order to
identify the determinants of a particular choice.
Firstly, milestone and round financing differ with respect to the degree of ex post
flexibility and ex ante inefficiency. Whereas round financing offers more ex post flexibility,
one obvious advantage of milestone financing is that it excludes renegotiation. Therefore,
it prevents hold-up by the investor what eliminates the ex ante inefficiency caused thereby.
This solution mechanism is modelled by No¨ldecke and Schmidt (1995) [19], for example.
In their model, the under-investment problem is overcome if the parties write a simple
option contract that is very closely related to milestone financing: the entrepreneur has
the right but not the obligation to exert certain effort levels and reach the specified
milestones5. If the milestones are reached, the investor must pay out the next tranche of
capital as determined in the initial contract. If the milestones are not reached, the default
point is specified by the action chosen by the entrepreneur, i.e. the result achieved. If the
difference between the two cases is larger than the entrepreneur’s effort costs, high effort
becomes worthwhile. So milestone financing is the more profitable, the more pronounced
the negative incentive effect due to possible hold-up by the investor.
In a similar way, Bigus (2002) [3] points out that the hold-up problem is the less
pronounced, the smaller the loss of the entrepreneur when the relationship ends and
a new investor must be found6. This means that the advantage of milestone financing
increases with a decline in the entrepreneur’s outside financing option.
Secondly, Cuny and Talmor (2004) [9] raise another advantage of milestone financing,
namely its greater ex ante flexibility: With milestone financing, one contract covers multi-
ple states of the world simultaneously and thus claims need not to be priced fairly ex post
but only ex ante, i.e. before knowing the outcome. This higher flexibility is especially valu-
able if there exists a pronounced heterogeneity of beliefs between the contracting parties
or if particular states require different incentive mechanisms.
3Thus no further funding is also an option.
4However, if any of the predetermined conditions are not met, no further funding will take place unless
both parties negotiate new terms.
5Note that the exercise of any standard option contract is followed by a guaranteed delivery, while
in our case some residual uncertainty is required because otherwise the moral hazard problem becomes
irrelevant.
6He interprets his result by stating that the loss can be reduced by reenforcing patent protection as
to avoid idea stealing by the investor. As in our data set, regulations are given, we focus only on the
financing options.
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Thirdly, Cuny and Talmor (2004) [9] also mention another possible disadvantage of
milestone financing. Milestone financing promises the whole investment (contingent on
milestones) ex ante whereas with round financing, there exists only a commitment to
finance the current investment round. This means that the investor’s claim should be
considerably larger under milestone than under round financing. If we assume pure eq-
uity financing, this implies a larger equity stake given to the investor and consequently,
a smaller equity stake retained by the entrepreneur: the entrepreneur’s incentives are re-
duced. Thus the larger the total investment, the larger the negative incentive effect due
to milestone financing. However, this is only valid with pure equity financing when the
VC’s equity stake is fixed initially and any additional capital is paid into the firm’s cap-
ital reserves. Albeit this construct is found in practice, other constructs that avoid this
problem are also frequently found. Thus the magnitude of this issue is not quite clear.
A further obvious, but extremely important caveat with respect to the choice of the
different staging forms is the feasibility aspect: round financing and milestone financing
must be implementable. As concerns round financing, it may cause prohibitively high
contracting costs for very short time intervals creating a lower limit for the minimum
duration of each round. The availability and enforceability of adequate milestone may be
even more crucial. Even though this question has been largely ignored in the mentioned
theoretical discussion, it is of extremely high empirical relevance. There are only a few
studies that explicitly consider the nature of signals available and their relation to con-
tracts. Repullo and Suarez (2004) [21], for example, look at the optimal capital structure
with staging and the influence of signal availability on contract design7. To sum up these
arguments, we can state the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Given feasibility of both staging forms, round financing compared to mile-
stone financing should be the more probable, the better the entrepreneur’s outside financing
option, the less pronounced the heterogeneity of beliefs between the contracting parties and
the higher the total investment amount.
3 The Data Set
3.1 Sample and Sample Selection Issues
Our analysis uses a proprietary, hand-collected data set from KfW based on contracts
between VCs and their portfolio firms. KfW has a unique position in Germany’s venture
capital market: being Germany’s largest promotional bank, it supports innovative firms
by promoting the investment of the VCs. Although, as concerns our sample, KfW never
directly invests in any of the portfolio firms, it becomes indirectly involved in the venture
7See section 4.2 and subsection 4.3.1 for details.
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capital deals in Germany. In order to obtain support from KfW, VCs had to apply by
submitting the key details of their relationship with the portfolio firm, most notably,
the term sheets, the business plans and the shareholder’s agreements. By providing us
with access to these documents, KfW gave us the unique opportunity to collect detailed
information on the relationship between the VC and its portfolio firm based on actual
contract data.
In order to reduce the very time-intensive task of collecting detailed information from
the numerous documents to a manageable size, we drew a random sample of 300 portfolio
firms8. We categorized each portfolio company into one of three classes with respect to
their investment date (before 1998, between 1998 and 2000, and after 2000) and eight
classes with respect to the program or program combination through which their VC
investor was supported by KfW. This categorization was undertaken with the objective
to achieve a balanced representation of the population. Table 1 gives an overview about
our sample and the support programs considered. Unfortunately, the data for 10 portfolio
companies could not be evaluated. Therefore, our random sample finally consists of 290
portfolio companies that were financed in 464 investment rounds between 1991 and 2004.
We are confident that we do not have any major bias in the selection of our sample
for two reasons. Firstly, as we were responsible for the sample selection process ourselves,
we ensured that no selection bias occurred via the provider of all our documents (KfW)
by drawing a random sample of all VC financed portfolio companies supported by KfW.
Secondly, KfW supported a large proportion of the population of all investments realized
by the German venture capital industry in the time period under consideration9. This
means that we have a representative sample of the German VC industry. One obvious
selection bias which we were not able to circumvent is the fact that we are concentrating
on one particular geographic region (Germany) and the associated venture capital market.
To a lesser degree this is true for the time period. We take all this into consideration by
interpreting our data sample as the description of a situation of a young and evolving
venture capital market.
As concerns the process of data collection, for each investment round, we evaluated
the company’s balance sheet data and its business plan to get information with respect
to the market position of the company and details about the financed project. Moreover,
we took from the term sheet and the shareholder’s agreement detailed information about
the security design, the timing, conditions and syndication of the investment, control
and information rights of the venture capitalists and exit covenants. We translated this
8We draw this sample out of the population of all portfolio firms that were financed by venture
capitalists which, in turn, were supported by KfW via one of the programmes mentioned in table 1.
9According to the German Venture Capital Association ([5] and [6]), there were 11854 seed, start-up
and expansion deals by its members in the relevant time period; KfW supported almost 7100 deals of
potential members. This implies a market coverage of approximately 60%.
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information into quantifiable variables. Finally, we complemented the data set with in-
formation about the venture capitalist supported by KfW. Overall, we gained a detailed
picture of the control and information rights embedded in these contracts as well as of
the characteristics of the entrepreneurial firm, the founder(s) and the VCs involved.
As usual in this type of studies, we were confronted with the problem that not al-
ways all data were available. Thus the number of observations may vary depending on
the variable studied. Typically, the amount invested and valuations were the most reli-
able variables whereas information on staging or investment memoranda were sometimes
missing. Still, we do not see a systematic selection bias problem because there are several
reasons for missing data. On the one hand, data may be missing for very young firms but,
on the other hand, we often had also the most exhaustive term sheets for these firms.
3.2 Variable Descriptions
In what follows, we describe the data set in more detail and introduce the variables
necessary for our regressions. Please note that all balance sheet data as well as exogenous
factors such as the state of product development or the degree of asymmetric information
is information that is known to the VC and the entrepreneur before they sign the contract.
3.2.1 Firm characteristics
We have information about the project and the respective portfolio company. The vari-
able AGE represents the age of the firm when the corresponding financing round is closed.
Moreover, we observe the firm’s industry: LIFE SCIENCES, INTERNET, IT/TELECOM,
TRADITIONAL HIGH-TECH and OTHER INDUSTRIES are all dummy variables that in-
dicate the project’s industry. GROWTH INDUSTRIES is a dummy variable that indicates
whether the firm is active in an industry with high growth potential, that is whether it
corresponds to one of the three first mentioned industries or not.
Furthermore, we observe the firm’s development stage in each financing round. First,
we have information about the firm’s development stage as defined by the German Ven-
ture Capital Association. We distinguish seed and start-up firms on the one hand, and
expansion and later stage firms on the other hand: the dummy EARLY STAGE indicates
whether the firm belongs to the first group or not. Second, we have balance sheet infor-
mation from the year preceding the closing date of the corresponding financing round. We
know whether the firm has any revenues (if this is the case, the dummy REVENUES takes
value one) and we observe the fixed asset ratio (FAR) that indicates the ratio of fixed
assets to balance sheet total10. Third, we have information about the firm’s achievements.
10As we have many missing values in our sample, we adopt the following procedure. For all firms in a
first financing round, with an age of less than one year and an investment phase of seed or early, we set
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We know whether the firm has finished its product tests; whether it already has a finished
product; whether the firm holds any patents or if it even has reference customers. We
define a dummy named PATENTS taking value one if the firm holds any patents or its
patents are pending when the financing round was closed. In addition, we construct two
types of indicator variables that we deem necessary to test our hypotheses. First, we cre-
ate a proxy for the degree of asymmetric information between both parties named AI. We
think that the degree of asymmetric information heavily depends upon the amount of ver-
ifiable information that is available for the project. Thus we create a categorical variable
by summing up four dummy variables which describe, in our opinion, essential steps in re-
ducing information asymmetry: the dummy AUDITED BALANCE SHEET that indicates
whether the balance sheet has been audited or not, the dummy FINISHED PRODUCT
which signals the existence of a product, the dummy REFERENCE CUSTOMERS that
indicates the existence of any reference customers and finally, the dummy BREAK EVEN
that takes value one if the firm has reached its break-even point. While we could have
included more factors in this definition, one problem we have is that we loose observa-
tions due to missing data. We thus strive for an optimal balance between measuring the
degree of asymmetric information and data availability. Additionally, we define a variable
which measures the relative degree of asymmetric information named RAI. This variable
is aimed at correcting for the developmental aspect inherent in the AI variable. It is de-
fined as the ratio of the degree of asymmetric information of the respective firm relative
to the average degree of asymmetric information of all firms in the respective development
stages (early stage, expansion, later stage). Second, we construct two measures that cap-
ture the current position of the firm in its development process: MARKET ENTRY takes
value one if the firm has both a finished product and revenues. This proxy indicates that
the introduction of the product in the market has successfully taken place. The dummy
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT takes value one if the product development process is just
starting, i.e. if there does not exist a finished product, there do not exist any reference
customers and product tests have not been successfully completed yet.
Finally, we observe whether the firm already received financing from banks or other
VCs prior to the observed investment round. More concretely, we define a dummy OUT-
SIDE FINANCE that takes value one if the portfolio company has received bank, angel
or other VC finance before the first round of VC financing we are looking at or if VC
financing takes (or has taken place before) via a syndicate of different VCs. We think that
both facts weaken the (lead) VC’s informational advantage over other investors and thus
ameliorate the entrepreneur’s outside financing option.
the fixed asset ratio to zero. If we lack information for higher rounds, we use the same ratio as in the
round before. If this ratio is not available, we code both as missing values. Additionally, we do not resort
to the preceding round in the case of second rounds where we coded the first round data to be zero.
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3.2.2 VC, entrepreneur and investment characteristics
Second, we have information about the VC, the entrepreneur and the investment char-
acteristics. We classify each VC according to his type into three categories named IN-
DEPENDENT VC, PUBLIC VC and OTHER VC. The latter category includes both bank-
dependent and corporate VCs11.
Moreover, we have information about the entrepreneurs running the portfolio firm. We
know if any of the founders has a PhD or higher degree of education (then, the dummy
variable RESEARCH DEGREE takes value one), we observe whether any of the founders
has a background in engineering or natural sciences (in this case, the dummy variable
SCIENCE BACKGROUND takes value one) and we know whether we face a repeat en-
trepreneur, i.e. someone who has already run a firm (this is captured by the dummy vari-
able REPEAT ENTREPRENEUR). In order to account for the value of the entrepreneur’s
human capital within the firm, we construct the variable E EXPERT. As we know that the
entrepreneur’s role is crucial for the technological development of the product, we take
into account both the qualification of the entrepreneur and the need of expertise by the
firm when constructing the variable. More concretely, the variable takes value one if the
firm belongs to a high-tech industry, the firm’s product has not finished any tests (i.e.
the firm strongly needs the entrepreneur’s contribution) and if the entrepreneur holds a
research degree (i.e. the entrepreneur is highly qualified).
Finally, we have information about the investment itself. We observe the year when
the financing round is closed and define three time dummies. PERIOD 1 takes value one
if the financing round is closed during the early period of relatively low venture capital
activity, namely before 1998, PERIOD 2 if it is closed during the boom, i.e. between
1998 and 2000 and PERIOD 3 if it is closed after 2000 - a period of relative decline and
reorganization of the venture capital industry. In addition, we observe the total amount
invested, the financing instrument used and the timing of the investment. In order to
control for the total amount of capital necessary to finance the project, we construct a
further proxy variable. We assume that each firm’s balance sheet has to reach a certain
minimum threshold before the firm can be taken public. This size is the average balance
sheet of all firms in Germany’s ”Neuer Markt” prior to their IPO in the five mentioned
industries12. The variable EBS (expected balance sheet) is then defined as the difference
between the average balance sheet of the public firms in the respective industry and the
current balance sheet of the firm we are studying and is again normalized by the average
balance sheet13.
11We also include the business angels in our sample in this category.
12We thank Stefanie Franzke for giving us access to her data on IPOs on the ”Neuer Markt”.
13For around 20 firms we observe this value to be negative. Our theory says nothing about this type
of firms. Therefore, we coded them as missing values in our regressions.
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3.2.3 Staging: Definition and Measurement
As the aim of this paper is to analyze the determinants of staging and its different forms,
it is important to exploit all the available information related to staging. Therefore, in
a first step, we define a dummy variable, named STAGING, that takes value one if the
project is financed in several steps and zero otherwise. This means that STAGING takes
value one whenever one of the different staging forms can be observed. These are captured
by two dummy variables: ROUND takes value one if staging is made in several independent
rounds and MILESTONE if future capital is contingent on specific known milestones.
To be more precise, the variable MILESTONE takes value one if at least 20% of the in-
vestment is dependent on the achievement of predefined milestones. The variable ROUND
takes value one whenever we observe a further financing round. Additionally, it takes
value one when we know that the current round does not finance the project until its
break-even. The latter information is taken from the VC’s investment memoranda. This
construction has two important implications. First, we even have information for the most
recently financed projects what allows us to circumvent two major econometric problems:
truncation and autocorrelation between the financing rounds. Second, the probability of
round financing may be overestimated (and therefore, the probability of staging) as the
above definition also includes rounds where staging was not expected in the beginning but
occurred “by accident”. The problem we faced was that it is quite difficult to distinguish
between the fact that further financing rounds were really unexpected or were just not
mentioned in the original contract.
We also define three subcategories: PURE MILESTONES, PURE ROUNDS and MIXES.
PURE MILESTONES takes value one if milestone financing occurs and we know that no
round financing takes place. Analogously, we define PURE ROUNDS. MIXES takes value
one if we know that milestone and round financing are used simultaneously. Finally,
we consider four categories of milestones: financial milestones, product milestones, firm
specific (other) milestones and different mixes of these types of milestones.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
In what follows, we want to give a more detailed overview about the sample. Therefore, in
a first step, we present some basic descriptive statistics. The average amount invested per
financing round is about 5.4 million euros and the portfolio companies are in average 5.08
years old when they receive VC financing for the first time. The medians are considerably
smaller (1.3 million euros and 2 years), an indication for outliers. At this point, one can
already infer that the percentage of early stage financing is quite high in our sample.
Indeed, 11.3% of the financing rounds correspond to seed financing and 61.5% to start-up
financing whereas only 20.7% of the financing rounds are related to expansion and 6.6%
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to later stage firms14. The portfolio companies are active in a broad range of industries:
20.7% in the field of life sciences, 36% in the sector of IT, telecommunications and software
development, 9.7% belong to the internet sector, 19.6% are active in traditional high-tech
industries and 14% could not be classified in neither of these sectors but are active in
rather less R&D intensive branches.
Second, we want to characterize the different types of financial instruments used (see
table 2). As a broad range of different combinations of financial instruments achieves the
same allocation of cash-flow and control rights, it is important to analyze these instruments
properly. Therefore, we classify each financial instrument used in a single financing round
along five characteristics: upside cash flow rights, downside protection, change of control,
cash flow rights at exit and voting rights. This classification procedure allows a better
interpretation of the securities used and guarantees better comparability. In a second
step, we distinguish four main categories (pure equity, pure debt15, debt-equity mixes
and convertibles) and nine subcategories. Thereby, the more detailed classification takes
into account the existence of liquidation preferences or the extent of the debt component
in debt-equity mixes. We see that whereas debt and different types of equity play an
important role (23 % and 29% respectively), debt-equity mixes are the most frequently
used type and occur in 38% of all financing rounds. Only 8% of all firms are financed by
convertible instruments.
Last but not least, table 3 describes the observed staging behavior in our sample.
Staging is used in 70% of the analyzed observations; pure rounds are the most frequently
used form (59%), followed by mixes (24%) and pure milestones (17%). There also seem to
be differences in the staging behavior across time and VC types. As shown in table 3, there
is a slight decline in the use of staging during the boom period - this may be attributed to
the reduced bargaining power of the VCs due to the high amounts of capital chasing few
deals in that time period - and an increase in period 3 slightly beyond the level of period 1.
Interestingly, when looking at the different staging forms, we recognize more pronounced
changes. While in period 1 only 7% of staging is in the form of pure milestones, 7% is
in the form of mixes and 86% is in the form of pure rounds, the composition changes
dramatically in the third period: staging in the form of pure milestones increases up to
24%, staging in the form of mixes increases to 29% and staging in the form of pure rounds
decreases to 47%. As concerns the behavior of the different VC types, we see that VC
types differ in both the implementation of staging per se and the use of the different forms
of staging. On the one hand, independent VCs use staging more often than other VC types
which in turn use staging more often than public VCs. On the other hand, independent
14These percentages refer to the financing rounds for which we have available data for the respective
criterion.
15Debt is actually subordinated debt, thus it is only senior to the equity in the firm.
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VCs use rounds in more than half of all staged firms, but use relatively more mixes than
pure milestones; public VCs use rounds in more than half of all staged firms, but they
use relatively more pure milestones than mixes; and finally, other VC types use rounds in
77% of all staged firms and, similarly to public VCs, they use more pure milestones than
mixes.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 The determinants of staging
We begin by evaluating hypothesis 1 that refers to the determinants of the staging decision.
In a first step, we discuss the instrumentalization of this hypothesis before presenting the
descriptive statistics and the results of the univariate probit models. We conclude by
discussing the robustness of our results and their implications.
4.1.1 Instrumentalization of the hypothesis
Hypothesis 1 can be divided into two parts. The first part states that the higher the
uncertainty, the higher the degree of asymmetric information and the more difficult future
monitoring, the more probable is staging. The second part refers to the positive causal
relationship between the importance of the entrepreneur’s human capital and the staging
decision.
Therefore, our empirical strategy can be based on the following model:
Stagingi = fi(Uncertainty, Asymmetric Information, Human Capital, Controls) + i,
where
Stagingi =
{
1 if firm i is staged
0 if firm i is not staged
While finding adequate controls is relatively straightforward, differentiating between un-
certainty, asymmetric information and firm development in general poses a relatively large
challenge. Several potential indicator variables capture different aspects of uncertainty and
asymmetric information like the firm’s age, the early stage dummy, the revenue dummy or
the AI variable16. However, none of these variables captures all different facets of uncer-
tainty and asymmetric information and all of them include a “developmental aspect”. This
means that all indicator variables compare the firms along their development path but not
from a cross-sectional perspective. Unfortunately, such a cross-sectional view cannot be
16Note that these variables are indeed apt to control for the mentioned aspects because further char-
acteristics of older firms which are crucial in other contexts - like the availability of internal funds - are
irrelevant for the large majority of firms in our sample.
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implemented for the majority of these variables17. We try to cope with this limitation for
the AI variable by using the RAI variable instead. However, this variable must be handled
with precaution as some of its components are fundamentally linked to the development
stage of the firm. This means that the differences between the firms of one comparison
group (e.g. all early stage firms) are quite small resulting in a relatively low information
content of the variable.
Thus we face a set of possible proxy variables that are quite heterogeneous in the
economic effects they capture but are certainly not mutually exclusive as they are partial
substitutes for each other. This view is also reconfirmed by the correlations of these vari-
ables (see table 5). As we face the econometric problem that we cannot include all proxies
simultaneously into the regression, we separately run the same standard specification for
each proxy variable to ensure the robustness of our findings.
4.1.2 Descriptive results
The descriptive results are shown in table 4. As we can see, the descriptive statistics
broadly confirm the first part of hypothesis 1: staged firms are significantly younger, have
lower revenues, are more probable to be early-stage firms and exhibit a higher degree of
asymmetric information. In fact, all four components of AI ( AUDITED BALANCE SHEET,
FINISHED PRODUCT, REFERENCE CUSTOMERS, BREAK EVEN) significantly differ
between staged and non-staged firms. Interestingly, the means of the RAI variable do not
significantly differ between staged and non-staged firms. This implies that developmental
aspects seem to play a crucial role. Though, given the above discussed limitations of our
RAI variable, this result does not mean that “pure” asymmetric information problems are
irrelevant.
The second part of hypothesis 1 is only partly confirmed. Table 4 shows that neither
the fixed asset ratio nor the majority of the human capital indicator variables signifi-
cantly differ between staged and non staged firms. Only the research degree dummy is
significantly higher for staged firms.
Finally, there are several control variables which differ significantly. There are sig-
nificantly more life-science and internet firms and significantly less traditional high-tech
firms and firms of other industries among the staged firms. This may be explained by the
fact that the former industries are related to a higher degree of uncertainty or to the fact
that they are more research-intensive and that therefore the entrepreneur’s human capital
is more important. Moreover, there exist significant differences with respect to the time
periods and the VC types.
17Because the developmental aspect is completely inherent to these variables.
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4.1.3 Regression results
In this subsection, we present the results for hypothesis 1 based on univariate probit
regressions with error terms clustered at the firm level. The results corresponding to the
first part of hypothesis 1 can be found in table 6. We find broad support for this first
part, namely the impact of uncertainty and asymmetric information. More specifically,
as outlined in subsection 1, we successively include all our different proxy variables and
get the following results: AGE is negative and significant at the 5% level, showing that
the older the firm, the less probable becomes staging; EARLY STAGE is positive and
significant at the 1% level indicating that the probability for staging is 19% higher for
early stage firms; and finally, REVENUES is negative and significant at the 5% level.
This means that the probability for staging is smaller for firms with revenues. In order
emphasize the asymmetric information aspect, we use the categorical variable AI. The
coefficient is significant at the 1% level: the higher the degree of asymmetric information
the more probable becomes staging. Using the components of AI on an individual basis
yields further insights: in fact, the result seems to be driven by only one component of
AI, namely BREAK EVEN which is significant at the 1% level. This already points out
that developmental aspects seem to play a predominant role. In order to blind out this
aspect and focus on “pure” asymmetric information, we subsequently include RAI in our
regression: the coefficient is insignificant, however. We also get an insignificant coefficient
for the expected sum of funding still necessary to bring the firm public (EBS)18.
It is also interesting to have a look at the control variables. Surprisingly, both the
control variables for the different VC types and for the time periods are insignificant. The
picture is different for the industry proxies though: LIFE SCIENCES, IT/TELECOM and
INTERNET are positive and broadly significant. This can be explained by the fact that
firms in these industries have a higher growth potential, a higher degree of uncertainty
and a higher need for the entrepreneur’s contribution to the firm.
To seize the idea of the entrepreneur’s importance to the firm explicitly, we run several
additional regressions (see table 7). In a first step, we include E EXPERT (variant a)
and, in a second step, the three different dummy variables concerning the entrepreneur’s
human capital (variant b): REPEAT ENTREPRENEUR, SCIENCE BACKGROUND and
RESEARCH DEGREE. We run each variant for three different specifications. First of all,
we include the fixed asset ratio in order to test our hypothesis. Whereas the fixed asset
ratio is not significant in the first variant, it is significant at the 10% level in the second
one. This result is not robust to the inclusion of AGE, for example. We then run the
18Interestingly, the coefficient turns out to be highly significant when coding the negative values as zeros.
The same is true for the means which differ at the 5% significance level. The result should be handled with
precaution, however, as these “unclassifiable” observations may be the driving force. Therefore, further
research is necessary at this point.
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regression with two of our proxy variables (AGE, EARLY STAGE)19. It turns out that
while our proxy variables continue to be highly significant, neither E EXPERT nor the
individual human capital variables are significant.
To conclude, we can say that the regression results are in line with the descriptive
statistics. They confirm the first part of hypothesis 1 that states that the higher the
uncertainty, the higher the degree of asymmetric information and the more difficult future
monitoring, the more probable is staging. Just as in the t-tests, all our proxies are highly
significant in each specification of our regressions. Note, however, that our variables are not
able to attribute the decision for staging to “pure” asymmetric information aspects only as
developmental aspects seem to matter, too. The importance of the entrepreneur’s human
capital, on the contrary, is partly confirmed by RESEARCH DEGREE in our descriptive
statistics, but none of the human capital variables is significant in the regressions. The
same is true for the fixed asset ratio. Thus the second part of hypothesis 1 that states
that staging should be the more probable, the more important the entrepreneur’s human
capital and the less tangible the assets is not confirmed by our data. This result as
well as the result concerning the asymmetric information aspect should be handled with
precaution, however, due to the high amount of missing values as well as the limitations
of our indicator variables.
4.1.4 Discussion
Apart from staging, there exist further potential contracting elements with a similar
impact. Especially debt grants the VC an exit option or can be used by the entrepreneur as
a signaling device just as staging. Even though we focus our analysis on the determinants
of the decision for staging and not on substitutabilities and complementarities between
different instruments, it is important to check that our results are not driven by the
underlying relationship between staging and debt.
However, we cannot directly include a debt variable in the above regressions because
debt would be an endogenous variable. It is a contractual element just like staging and thus
its use is determined simultaneously to staging. In order to cope with this disadvantage and
at the same time do justice to possible substitutability effects, we run robustness checks for
our previous results by splitting our sample in one part that includes all observations that
have a strong debt component and a second part with all observations that do not have
a strong debt component. Strong debt component means pure debt, nonstandard debt or
convertibles of the subcategories “US style” or “mixes” (see table 2). For these securities,
the dummy DEBT COMPONENT takes value one. We find that the determinants for the
19Note that AI and RAI as well as REVENUES are highly correlated with the human capital variables
so that we cannot include them in our regressions.
16
staging decision are broadly confirmed for each of the two subsamples20.
The major differences are the following. As concerns the descriptive statistics, the
time and industry effects which we find for the complete sample, seem to arise almost
exclusively from the observations with a strong debt component. The same is true for AU-
DITED BALANCE SHEET. On the other hand, the significant difference of RESEARCH
DEGREE can only be confirmed for the observations without a strong debt component.
In addition, the fixed asset ratio turns out to be important for the subsample of obser-
vations with a strong debt component although it is neither significant in the subsample
of observations without a strong debt component nor in the complete sample. This result
is also confirmed in the regressions. Whereas all our proxy variables significantly differ in
the descriptive statistics, in the regressions, this is not the case anymore: whereas EARLY
STAGE continues to be highly significant in both subsamples, AGE looses its significance
for the subsample of observations with a strong debt component (the sign continues to be
correct). The reverse is true for BREAK EVEN. AI looses its significance in both subsam-
ples but the sign continues to be negative. With respect to the human capital variables, we
do not get any robust results in any of the two subsamples. The regression results must,
however, be handled with precaution due to the limited number of observations. To sum
up, we get evidence that the determinants of staging do not change fundamentally when
splitting our sample in two subsamples according to the use of a strong debt component
or not.
In addition, it is interesting to compare our results on staging to the results found in the
papers based on US data. As mentioned above, Gompers (1995) [11] as well as Kaplan
and Stro¨mberg (2003) and (2004) [15], [16] consider staging in their studies. Gompers
shows that the younger the firms, the stronger is the staging effect, i.e. fewer capital is
released to the venture and funding duration is shorter. This is broadly in line with our
findings: staging is more probable for younger firms. Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (2003) [15]
find that round duration is longer for repeat entrepreneurs, while Kaplan and Stro¨mberg
(2004) [16] show that round duration increases in the degree of external risk, while the
amount of funding that is contingent increases with internal risks. Both findings are again
broadly in line with our findings: staging is more probable for firms with higher risks.
To conclude this subsection, the results are quite robust and in line with the existing
empirical research: we find that the decision for staging is determined by the degree of
uncertainty and asymmetric information the investor is confronted with. Throughout all
our regressions, the proxy variables AGE, EARLY STAGE, REVENUES and AI are highly
significant. The relative degree of asymmetric information is never significant, however.
The same is true for the expected investment amount. With respect to our human capital
20For sake of brevity, we omit the relevant tables here. Of course, they are available upon request from
the authors.
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variables, we get mixed results. Whereas the descriptive statistics partly point out such
an effect, it is not reconfirmed in the regression results. As mentioned above, these last
results should be handled with precaution, however, due to the limitations of our proxy
variables.
4.2 How does milestone financing work?
As mentioned above, the existence of suitable signals is a crucial prerequisite for the use
of milestone financing. This is in strong contrast to round financing which does not call
for a contingent contract to be feasible. Thus before analyzing the decision between the
different staging modes in more detail in the next section, we want to investigate the
specifics of milestone financing.
The essential requirement for milestone financing is - as mentioned - the existence of
suitable milestones which must be able to describe the expected development of the firm
in the future. Therefore, the specific type used should heavily depend on the development
stage of the firm. We distinguish four different categories of milestones in our data set:
product milestones such as the completion of a prototype or satisfactory product tests,
financial milestones such as a minimum sales level or other (firm specific) milestones.
One typical example for these other milestones is the hiring of a specific type of manager
but this category comprises a broad range of different milestones. Finally, we classify all
mixtures of different milestone types as a separate category.
The descriptive statistics for the different kinds of milestones can be found in table
9. These descriptive statistics give us first insights that product and financial milestones
seem to be used in successive development stages. We observe that product milestones
(in comparison to all other types of milestones) are used more frequently with a higher
absolute and relative degree of asymmetric information, for firms which are about to start
their development process and for which the entrepreneur’s human capital is crucial. On
the contrary, product milestones are used less often with firms which already entered the
market, which have a finished product, reference customers and reached break-even. By
comparison, financial signals are more frequently used with a lower degree of asymmetric
information, in firms with reference customers and in which the entrepreneur’s human
capital is only of marginal importance. These results are also confirmed by our univariate
probit regressions which we run with each milestones dummy as independent variable.
In table 10, we see that both AI and RAI as well as PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT are
significant in the probit regressions for product milestones. This strengthens our result
that product milestones are rather used for firms in very early development stages, i.e. for
firms for which the product development is the main challenge. By contrast, as concerns
the regressions with FINANCIAL MILESTONE as independent variable, we find that AGE,
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AI, and REFERENCE CUSTOMERS are positive and significant whereas PRODUCT DE-
VELOPMENT is negative significant. This, in turn, underlines our descriptive statistics
stating that financial milestones are used with more developed firms as only for these kind
of firms financial statements become really meaningful.
The remaining two milestone type categories, namely other, firm-specific milestones
and mixes, seem to be used in quite heterogeneous cases. The only variables that are
significant in the regressions (see table 11) are the following: for other milestones, the
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT is negative significant. This shows that if the firm is about
to start its product development process, other milestones are used less frequently. This
result is intuitive as product signals are certainly optimal in this case. The same insights
can be derived from our descriptive statistics, too. Interestingly, the mean of the expected
investment amount is significantly higher for other milestones relative to all other types
of milestones: firms that need more funding to complete their project are more inclined
to use firm-specific milestones. As concerns signal mixes, we do not get any robust results
neither in the descriptive statistics nor in the univariate probit regressions. Mixes seem
to be used in quite heterogeneous cases which we are not able to identify given our data.
It is further interesting to see whether the use of specific milestones differs between
mixes and pure milestone financing. In table 8, we observe that product milestones are
used significantly more with mixes than with pure milestone financing; that there does
not exist a significant difference in the use of financial and other milestones; and that
milestone mixes are used more with pure milestone financing than with mixes (though the
difference is only significant at the 11% level). In subsection 2.2, we noted that adequate
milestones must be available for the whole development process in order to be able to
implement pure milestone financing. As product milestones cover only the first part of
the development process, it is clear that they should be used more often with mixes
than with pure milestone financing. As financial and other milestones are used for more
advanced firms, they can, in principle, describe the remaining development process. This
implies that there should not exist a significant difference in the use of financial and other
milestones between the two forms. The difference in the use of milestone mixes may be
explained by two facts: one the one hand, if suitable milestone mixes can be defined, such
a mix is able to cover the whole development process; on the other hand, it is quite costly
to define a mix of different milestones. Thus it is clear that milestone mixes are indeed
observed more often with pure milestone financing than with mixes.
To conclude, our data gives us first insights with respect to the use of different mile-
stone types. We find that product and financial milestones are used in successive develop-
ment stages and that the availability of milestones seems to be important when choosing
one form of staging or another.
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4.3 The determinants of the different forms of staging
In this last section, we analyze the determinants of the choice of one of the different forms
of staging by testing hypothesis 2. Once we look at the data, a major problem arises: in
contrast to the theoretical discussion that focuses on the differences between round and
milestone financing, we additionally observe mixes of these two forms. Therefore, in a
first step, we attempt to explain the appearance of mixes and reinterpret hypothesis 2
from this new perspective. Moreover, we have to discuss the instrumentalization of this
hypothesis. In a second step, we present descriptive results before running multinomial
probit models in order to identify the determinants of the use of the different staging
forms. The section concludes with a summary of our results.
4.3.1 Instrumentalization of the hypothesis
Hypothesis 2 states that given feasibility of both forms of staging, round financing relative
to milestone financing should be the more probable, the better the entrepreneur’s outside
financing option, the less pronounced the heterogeneity of beliefs between the contracting
parties and the higher the total investment amount. In order to test this hypothesis,
adequate proxies for the entrepreneur’s outside financing option and the heterogeneity
of beliefs between the contracting parties as well as the total investment amount are
necessary. Moreover, we have to instrumentalize the feasibility aspect what will allow us
to explain the appearance of mixes.
As concerns feasibility, one has to distinguish the feasibility of milestone financing and
the feasibility of round financing. As concerns the feasibility of milestone financing, the
crucial prerequisite is the availability of adequate milestones. This implies - as suggested
by our results about the characteristics of milestone financing - that for very early stage
firms, pure milestone financing may not be feasible because adequate milestones can only
be defined for the near future and not for the whole development process. In this case,
round financing is always necessary to implement staging. Then mixes between milestone
and round financing may act as a second-best choice to overcome the negative effects of
potential hold-up by the VC. This is due to the fact that with mixes in comparison to
pure rounds, a new financing round only becomes necessary later on once more reliable
information exists. Still we have to bear in mind that ex post flexibility is reduced when
using mixes. If pure milestone financing is feasible, all three staging modes can be chosen
and the decision depends on the trade-off between the negative incentive effect and ex
post flexibility.
With respect to the feasibility of pure round financing, we mentioned in subsection
2.2 that because of prohibitively high contracting costs, each round may have to cover
a minimum length. If this is the case, with pure round financing, the effect of staging
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is less pronounced than with pure milestone financing: negative NPV projects may be
abandoned only relatively late, for example. Consequently, a strong staging effect can be
implemented solely by pure milestone financing or mixes between rounds and milestones.
If we assume that for firms with a high degree of asymmetric information and uncertainty,
a strong staging effect is more desirable, either pure milestone or mixes should be used
with these firms. In this case, mixes may act as a second-best alternative to reduce the
loss of ex post flexibility.
With these two problems in mind, we can concretize hypothesis 2. In addition, we
conjecture that heterogeneity of beliefs between the contracting parties is only relevant
with early stage firms. If the feasibility of milestone financing is the limiting factor, we
get the following modified hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a:
• Pure milestone financing relative to both pure round financing and mixes should be
observed more frequently with more advanced firms for which adequate milestones
can be defined for the whole remaining development process.
• Pure milestone financing relative to pure round financing and mixes should be ob-
served more frequently for firms with a worse outside financing option and with a
lower total investment amount.
• Mixes relative to pure round financing should be observed more frequently for firms
with a worse outside financing option and with a more pronounced heterogeneity of
beliefs between the contracting parties.
If the feasibility of round financing is the limiting factor, we get the following competing
modified hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2b:
• Pure round financing relative to both mixes and pure milestone financing should be
observed more frequently with more advanced firms for which a strong staging effect
is no longer necessary.
• Pure round financing relative to pure milestone financing and mixes should be ob-
served more frequently for firms with a better outside financing option and with a
higher total investment amount.
• Mixes relative to pure milestone financing should be observed more frequently for
firms with a better outside financing option, with a less pronounced heterogeneity of
beliefs between the contracting parties and with a higher total investment amount.
In order to test these modified statements about the determinants of the different
forms of staging, we need suitable proxy variables for the entrepreneur’s outside financing
option, the degree of heterogeneity of beliefs as well as the total investment amount.
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With respect to the entrepreneur’s outside financing option, we conjecture that both
the information available when conditions are renegotiated as well as previous contacts
with other investors besides the VC may play a crucial role. If the VC, as an inside investor,
refuses to continue to fund a project, this is a negative signal for outside investors. Thus
the entrepreneur has to convince possible investors of the profitability of his project.
Therefore, he needs credible, hard information. This means that the degree of asymmetric
information must be relatively low. In addition, in an advanced development stage, the
firm has already established a relatively long track record. This, of course, may also help to
ameliorate the entrepreneur’s outside financing option. On the other hand, if the project
was or is financed by financial intermediaries other than the (lead) VC (banks, syndicating
VCs, angels), the entrepreneur’s outside financing option is better as he may also resort
to these (former) inside investors for new funding.
With respect to the heterogeneity of beliefs, we conjecture that it should be the more
pronounced the higher the degree of asymmetric information and uncertainty because each
contracting party holds its own expectations about the future. Naturally, entrepreneurs
tend to be more optimistic than VCs. However, as soon as hard facts exist about the
profitability of the project, beliefs should become less subjective and therefore more ho-
mogeneous.
In order to reflect the mentioned ideas, we use different indicator variables for the de-
velopment stage of the firm (PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT, MARKET ENTRY), the degree
of asymmetric information (AI, its single components and RAI to reduce the developmental
aspect), the tangibility of assets (FAR) and the existence of further investors (OUTSIDE
FINANCE). Moreover, we use the expected balance sheet EBS as a proxy for the total
investment size. Finally, we use E EXPERT as a proxy variable for the importance of the
entrepreneur’s human capital because we expect the negative incentive effect of poten-
tial hold-up by the VC to be the more harmful the more important the entrepreneur’s
contribution.
4.3.2 Descriptive results
We start by comparing the means of firms that use pure milestones to those that use
pure round financing. The summary statistics are given in table 12. We observe that
firm characteristics do not play any significant role. This may be explained by the fact
that the mentioned feasibility problems are both relevant and that therefore, there do
not exist any significant differences. But we observe that the expected funding needs
(EBS) are significantly higher with milestones. This contradicts the argument of Cuny
and Talmor (2004) [9] that milestone financing should be used less often with higher
investment amounts because it reduces the entrepreneur’s incentives. The result should
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be handled with precaution because of the limitations of our variable21. However, the
result can also be interpreted from a different angle: when the entrepreneur’s financing
needs are relatively large, he crucially depends on the subsequent injection of funds. This
implies that it should be more difficult to find an outside investor due to the relatively
high amount of funding necessary, i.e. to his relatively bad outside financing option. This
argument is further underlined by the significant difference in the means of OUTSIDE
FINANCE. In addition, there are both VC and time effects.
The decision between pure milestone financing and a mix of milestone and round
financing, on the other hand, is determined by firm characteristics. If the degree of asym-
metric information decreases, pure milestone financing becomes more probable than mixes.
The same is true for RAI. In addition, the means of different variables that proxy for the
development stage of the firm differ significantly, indicating that milestone financing is
rather used with more developed firms. See, for example, PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT,
MARKET ENTRY, FINISHED PRODUCT as well as REVENUES. This supports hypoth-
esis 2a and more concretely the assumption that the foreseeability aspect is crucial: pure
milestone financing can only be implemented for more developed firms for which ade-
quate milestones can be defined. At the same time, this contradicts hypothesis 2b which
predicts that both forms of staging should be equally likely for early stage firms. On the
other hand, we find evidence for the impact of the hold-up problem on the choice of one
of these two forms of staging. First, the mean of the expected funding needs (EBS) is
significantly higher for pure milestone financing. This underlines again that the outside
option of the entrepreneur is the worse, the higher the funding needs and thus, milestone
financing is more advantageous. Second, the mean of OUTSIDE FINANCE is significantly
lower for firms that use milestone financing: mixes are used more frequently when other
financial intermediaries than the (lead) VC are or were involved in the firm. Then the
outside financing option of the entrepreneur is better and so the negative impact of round
financing decreases. Finally, there are VC type effects.
In a last step, we consider the decision between pure round financing and mixes. We
see that the mean of PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT is significantly higher for mixes than for
pure round financing. The same is true for E-EXPERT as well as its component RESEARCH
DEGREE. Consequently, a firm in an earlier development stage, which is confronted with
a higher degree of uncertainty and for which the entrepreneur’s human capital is crucial,
tends to use more mixes than pure round financing22. This result can be explained by both
hypotheses: given the foreseeability problem, mixes are the best way to avoid hold-up by
the VC when pure milestone financing is impossible because adequate milestones cannot
be defined for the whole development process ex ante. The hold-up problem is expected
21The variable where we coded the negative values as zeros also turned out to be insignificant.
22This result is further emphasized by the dummy REFERENCE CUSTOMERS.
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to be the more pronounced, the less developed the firm in the moment of investment: the
less developed the firm, the smaller the probability that hard facts about its success are
available when new funding becomes necessary. Thus hypothesis 2a is confirmed. On the
other hand, given the contracting cost problem, round financing is not desirable for rather
early stage firms and in this case, mixes are the second-best choice. Thus hypothesis 2b
is also confirmed. Finally, VC effects and time effects can be observed.
To conclude, we find that although hypothesis 2a is broadly confirmed by our de-
scriptive statistics, hypothesis 2b cannot be completely rejected: both the definition of
adequate milestones for the whole development process as well as the minimum dura-
tion of pure round financing seem to be limiting factors. In addition, the influence of the
hold-up potential by the VC is crucial in the choice of one specific form of staging.
4.3.3 Regression results
As pointed out above, we are interested in identifying the determinants of the different
forms of staging given that staging is to be implemented. The contracting parties maximize
the utility they derive from a specific form of staging by taking into account the advantages
and disadvantages of each form. In order to reflect this unobserved utility maximization,
we use a discrete choice model. As we want to test two competing hypotheses which imply
different logical orders for the three staging modes, we refrain from implementing such
an order empirically. Therefore, the appropriate model in our situation is an unordered
multinomial logit or probit model. In fact, we will run multinominal probit regressions
with varying base categories to avoid the IIA assumption implicit in the multinomial logit
model. The results are given in tables 13 and 14.
With respect to the decision between pure milestone financing and pure round financ-
ing, we get the following results: pure milestone financing is used significantly more often
for firms which have already entered the market and that are confronted with a lower
degree of asymmetric information (measured by both AI and RAI). This means that mile-
stones in comparison to pure round financing are rather used for more advanced firms
for which the project’s development is predictable and thus adequate milestones can be
implemented. This result clearly contradicts hypothesis 2b and confirms hypothesis 2a:
the feasibility of milestone financing seems to be the crucial limitation when choosing
between the different forms of staging. In addition, OUTSIDE FINANCE is negative and
highly significant in all specifications. This indicates that milestone financing is used when
the entrepreneur’s outside option is relatively low as he cannot resort to former investors or
additional syndicating partners when the (lead) VC denies further funding. The expected
investment amount (EBS) does not turn out to be significant in our regressions anymore
when explicitly controlling for the outside financing option. Thus besides the feasibility
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aspect the impact of potential hold-up by the VC is the crucial determinant. Finally, the
time and VC effects which we observe in the descriptive statistics are confirmed: public
VCs use significantly more pure milestone financing and in period 1, significantly less
pure milestone financing is used whereas in period 3 significantly more pure milestone
financing is used. This indicates a steady decline in the use of pure round financing.
With respect to the use of mixes relative to pure round financing, we find that mixes
are more often used for very early stage firms, i.e. for firms which are on the verge of
starting their product development process. This underlines hypothesis 2a that mixes
are implemented to avoid hold-up when pure milestone financing is not feasible, i.e. for
very early stage firms where the project’s development path is unpredictable and the
probability that hard facts will be available when new funding becomes necessary is very
low. In addition, we again observe time and VC effects: mixes are used significantly less in
period 1 and public and independent VCs are more inclined to use mixes in comparison
to pure rounds. The results for independent VCs are not robust, however.
Finally, as concerns the use of mixes relative to pure milestone financing, we observe
that mixes are more often used when the product development is about to start, the firm
has not already entered the market, the degree of asymmetric information is relatively
high and the entrepreneur’s human capital is crucial. While this seems counterintuitive
at a first view, it underlines hypothesis 2a, i.e. the foreseeability aspect, namely that
milestone financing is not implementable for very early stage firms. At the same time,
it contradicts hypothesis 2b which predicts that both forms are to be used in the same
development stages. Moreover, OUTSIDE FINANCE is negative. Although the coefficients
are not significant in all our specification, the sign is always correct, indicating that mile-
stone financing is rather used when the hold-up potential is pronounced, i.e. when the
entrepreneur cannot resort to other (known) financiers. This means that both foreseeabil-
ity and renegotiation aspects are important when choosing milestone financing or mixes.
Finally, we find that the VC and time effects are not robust in our regressions but there is
a tendency that independent VCs use significantly less pure milestones and that in period
3, significantly more pure milestone financing was used.
Thus we can state that the descriptive results are in line with the regressions and
thus with hypothesis 2a. All in all, this means that there exist two different determinants:
first of all, foreseeability decides whether pure milestone financing is feasible; second,
the intensity of the hold-up problem determines the choice between the available forms
of staging. Contracting cost arguments do not seem to play an important role for the
feasibility of round financing.
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4.3.4 Summary
To sum up, the choice between the different forms of staging is driven by the anticipation
of the impact of renegotiation possibilities: we find that contracts are the more complete,
the more pronounced the negative expected incentive effect for the entrepreneur caused
by the VC’s hold-up. At the same time, the foreseeability of the project’s development
severely restricts contract completeness by rendering milestone financing impossible.
Complete contingent contracts are only feasible if foreseeability is given. This implies
that pure milestone financing should be more probable for more advanced firms what is
broadly confirmed by our data. If foreseeability is given, milestone financing should be
used more often than mixes if the negative incentive effect is pronounced. The same should
be true for the comparison between pure milestone financing and round financing. Again,
this is just what we find in our data: if the entrepreneur has a good outside financing
option due to contacts to former investors or other investors in the syndicate, the hold-up
potential and therefore, the negative incentive effects are less pronounced23. Consequently,
milestone financing is used less frequently than mixes and than pure rounds.
If complete contingent contracts cannot be implemented because foreseeability is not
given, the choice to be made is only between mixes and pure round financing. In this case,
mixes are the most complete contracts available. Thus mixes should be used more often
than pure rounds when the impact of potential renegotiation is pronounced. Indeed, the
data shows that mixes are used with less developed firms for which hard information is
not expected to be available in the near future and consequently, outside funding will be
difficult to obtain.
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to analyze the determinants of staging per se as well as its
different modes. Thereby, we do not only focus on the VC specific literature but also on
the literature on renegotiation to deduce relevant hypotheses which we test against our
data.
We find that the decision for staging is driven by the extent of asymmetric information
and uncertainty in the firm. It is important to keep in mind that we proxy for asymmetric
23In order to test the robustness of OUTSIDE FINANCE, we ignore the existence of syndicating VCs for
a moment. We conjecture, however, that the possibility to resort to syndicating partners is crucial for
the entrepreneur when the (lead) VC denies further funding. This is especially important as syndicating
partners have a further informational advantage in comparison to former investors which financed the
venture before the initial VC investment. It turns out that, as expected, this alternative specification
hardly yields any significant results anymore. However, there is no contradiction with respect to the
previous mentioned results either. For sake of brevity, we omit the relevant tables here. Of course, they
are available upon request from the authors.
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information by taking a developmental perspective. On the contrary, the tangibility of
assets and the entrepreneur’s human capital do not matter. With respect to these results,
it is important to keep in mind the limitations of our variables. Still, the results are quite
robust and in line with earlier studies based on US data.
As regards the characteristics of milestone financing, we present evidence that the type
of milestone used depends on the position of the firm in its development process. Very
early stage firms tend to use product milestones while developed firms use financial or
other milestones. Moreover, product milestones seem to be used more often with mixes
between round and milestone financing. Mixes of different types of milestones, on the
other hand, seem to be used more often with pure milestone financing.
Finally, we are able to show that for the decision between the different forms of staging
the investment amount does not seem to play a significant role. Rather the trade-off
between the anticipation of the impact of renegotiation on the entrepreneur’s incentives
and the desired ex post flexibility is decisive: the more pronounced the negative incentive
effect caused by renegotiation, the more complete contracts should be in order to limit
hold-up by the VC. However, the degree of contract completeness is restrained by the need
for predictability of the project’s development path. If this is not the case, pure milestones
(and therefore complete contracts) are impossible to define and mixes present a second-
best choice to overcome the negative incentive effect. Both aspects are confirmed by our
data. To be more precise, we show that pure milestone financing is used less frequently for
very early stage firms for which predictability is less probable. Our data further confirms
that the degree of contract completeness depends on the entrepreneur’s outside financing
option which we measure in two forms: first, we look whether external funding before the
investment of the VC has taken place or whether the investment is (or was) made via a
syndicate of VCs and second whether hard information is available.
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6 Tables
Table 1: Sample Selection
-1997 1998 - 2000 2000 - 2004 Total
1 51 102 22 175
10 0 12 4 16
11 0 8 1 9
100 4 16 2 22
1000 1 33 32 66
1001 0 6 3 9
1010 0 1 1 2
1011 0 1 0 1
Total 56 179 65 300
Notes: 1 = Technology Participation Programme (KfW/BMWA + KfW/BMTF - Technologie-Beteiligungsprogramm); 10
= ERP-Innovation Programme (ERP-Innovationsprogramm (Beteiligungsvariante)); 100 = Guarantee Programme (KfW-
Risikokapitalprogramm - Garantien); 1000 = Fund Programme (KFW-Risikokapitalprogramm - Fondsfinanzierung); and mixes
Table 2: Summary Statistics I: Security Choice
Category Equity Debt & Equity Convertibles Debt
Description Pure Equity Debt> Debt< US Style Convertible Mixes Nonstandard Pure
Equity + LP Equity Equity Equity Debt Debt
Category 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 4 9
Upside Cash Flow Rights X X X X X X X X -
Downside Protection - X X - X X X X X
Change of Control - - X X X - X X X
Cash Flow Rights at Exit X X X X X X X - -
Voting Rights X X X X - X X - -
51 85 157 20 11 10 16 11 96
Total Percentage 29% 38% 8% 23%
Notes: We report the VC’s security choice which is categorized according to the indicated five characteristics. We were confronted
with 7 missing values.
Table 3: Summary Statistics II: Staging Behavior
No Staging Staging Pure Milestones Pure Rounds Mixes
Complete Sample 135 (0.30) 311 (0.70) 53 (0.17) 181 (0.59) 73 (0.24)
Period 1 18 (0.28) 46 (0.72) 3 (0.07) 38 (0.86) 3 (0.07)
Period 2 86 (0.34) 167 (0.66) 25 (0.16) 93 (0.59) 39 (0.25)
Period 3 33 (0.24) 106 (0.76) 25 (0.24) 50 (0.47) 31 (0.29)
Independent VC 66 (0.31) 215 (0.69) 28 (0.14) 117 (0.57) 60 (0.29)
Public VC 44 (0.45) 54 (0.55) 17 (0.32) 27 (0.51) 9 (0.17)
Other VC Types 27 (0.36) 48 (0.64) 7 (0.15) 36 (0.77) 4 (0.09)
Notes: The first column refers to the number of observations and the second to the percentage.
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Table 7: The Determinants of the Decision for Staging (2)
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b Model 3a Model 3b
dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z
FAR -0.073 -0.86 -0.148 -1.65
Age -0.006 -2.00 -0.024 -3.27
Early Stage 0.256 4.03 0.203 2.97
E Expert -0.027 -0.42 -0.081 -1.27 -0.114 -1.59
Science Background -0.052 -0.42 -0.068 -0.54 -0.092 -0.83
Repeat Entrepreneur -0.003 -0.06 0.017 0.32 -0.016 -0.29
Research Degree 0.049 0.85 0.003 0.05 0.048 0.81
Patents 0.014 0.26 0.013 0.22 0.012 0.22 -0.026 -0.44 -0.024 -0.40 -0.019 -0.31
Independent VC 0.083 1.17 0.086 1.13 0.073 1.06 0.114 1.49 0.078 1.08 0.081 1.04
Public VC -0.093 -1.15 -0.098 -1.07 -0.086 -1.05 -0.085 -0.90 -0.118 -1.38 -0.126 -1.29
Period 1 0.115 1.69 0.091 1.24 0.108 1.53 0.080 1.05 0.087 1.20 0.089 1.19
Period 3 0.119 2.24 0.098 1.77 0.076 1.49 0.063 1.10 0.087 1.67 0.067 1.19
Life Sciences 0.183 2.11 0.065 0.64 0.207 2.49 0.118 1.19 0.221 2.65 0.073 0.76
Internet 0.212 2.42 0.145 1.18 0.147 1.65 0.039 0.32 0.110 1.15 0.032 0.27
IT/Telecom 0.140 1.86 0.033 0.37 0.118 1.56 0.044 0.48 0.116 1.52 0.037 0.43
Trad. High-Tech 0.050 0.61 -0.029 -0.28 0.059 0.72 0.021 0.21 0.040 0.49 -0.045 -0.46
No of Obs. 383 298 411 322 400 311
Wald/χ2 33.99 22.23 31.90 25.05 48.18 28.42
Prob. 0.0004 0.0519 0.0008 0.0227 0.0000 0.0079
R2 0.0755 0.0635 0.0838 0.0851 0.1084 0.0823
Log Likelihood -216.37 -161.40 -228.22 -168.13 -220.80 -167.40
Notes: Probit regression with clustered standard errors at firm-level. Dependent variable is the dummy variable STAGING which takes
value one when staging takes place and 0 otherwise. Marginal effects are indicated.
Table 8: The Use of the Different Milestone Types with Pure Milestones and Mixes
Pure Milestones Mixes
Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev. N Pr(|T | > |t|)
Product Milestone 0.208 0.409 53 0.342 0.478 73 0.0915
Financial Milestone 0.113 0.320 53 0.123 0.331 73 0.8637
Other Milestone 0.208 0.409 53 0.205 0.407 73 0.9777
Milestone Mix 0.472 0.504 53 0.329 0.473 73 0.1098
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics of the different milestone types for the use
with pure milestone financing and mixes respectively.
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Table 10: The Determinants of a Specific Milestone Category (1)
The determinants of product milestones
Model 1 Model 4 Model 2 Model 3 Model 5
dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z
Age -0.025 -1.45
Early Stage 0.094 0.72
RAI -0.222 -2.33
AI -0.117 -2.75
Break Even -0.051 -0.29
Aud. Balance Sheet -0.090 -0.78
Finished Product -0.185 -1.47
Reference Customers -0.096 -0.76
Product Development 0.269 2.78
Patents -0.043 -0.49 0.066 0.54 0.046 0.39 0.039 0.32 -0.027 -0.29
Independent VC -0.009 -0.05 -0.160 -0.90 -0.097 -0.59 -0.090 -0.55 -0.025 -0.19
Public VC -0.239 -1.51 -0.323 -2.01 -0.292 -1.87 -0.288 -1.83 -0.209 -1.41
Period 1 0.224 1.06 0.380 1.74 0.321 1.55 0.294 1.35 0.129 0.71
Period 3 0.027 0.31 0.117 1.09 0.124 1.17 0.121 1.13 0.074 0.79
Growth Industries 0.039 0.31 0.033 0.27 0.024 0.20
Life Sciences 0.094 0.71 0.083 0.67
Internet -0.241 -2.02 -0.243 -1.97
IT/Telecom -0.161 -1.44 -0.127 -1.08
Trad. High-Tech -0.125 -1.14 -0.066 -0.56
No of Obs. 120 81 84 84 115
Wald /χ2 20.40 17.54 15.68 16.92 24.90
Prob. 0.0257 0.0250 0.0283 0.0762 0.0055
R2 0.1346 0.1500 0.1387 0.1420 0.1776
Log Likelihood -61.078 -43.825 -45.430 -45.259 -56.688
The determinants of financial milestones
Model 1 Model 4 Model 2 Model 3 Model 5
dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z
Age 0.009 1.91
Early Stage -0.116 -1.44
RAI 0.034 1.07
AI 0.042 2.23
Break Even 0.018 0.37
Aud. Balance Sheet 0.052 1.28
Finished Product -0.047 -1.12
Reference Customers 0.132 2.91
Product Development -0.061 -1.65
Patents 0.053 1.00 0.049 1.22 0.071 1.75 0.052 1.63 0.057 1.15
Independent VC -0.185 -1.72 -0.123 -1.42 -0.127 -1.31 0.111 -1.40 -0.165 -1.94
Public VC -0.013 -0.15 -0.009 -0.15 -0.007 -0.09 0.001 0.02 -0.014 -0.19
Period 1 0.304 1.93 0.149 1.26 0.119 1.23 0.159 1.83 0.292 1.81
Period 3 -0.002 -0.04 0.002 0.05 -0.024 -0.50 -0.017 -0.47 -0.005 -0.10
Growth Industries -0.053 -1.07 -0.047 -0.90 0.043 -1.01
Life Sciences -0.081 -1.14 -0.080 -1.12
Internet 0.075 0.67 0.023 0.25
IT/Telecom -0.030 -0.46 -0.067 -1.02
Trad. High-Tech -0.040 -0.57 -0.043 -0.59
No of Obs. 120 81 84 84 115
Wald /χ2 22.90 8.34 16.29 24.61 22.04
Prob. 0.0111 0.4010 0.0226 0.0061 0.0149
R2 0.1843 0.1791 0.2350 0.2862 0.1610
Log Likelihood -33.574 -17.558 -20.210 -18.858 -32.277
Notes: Probit regression with clustered standard errors at firm-level. Dependent variable is the dummy vari-
able PRODUCT (FINANCIAL) MILESTONE which takes value one when a financial (product) milestone
is used with milestone financing and 0 otherwise. Marginal effects are indicated.
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Table 11: The Determinants of a Specific Milestone Category (2)
The determinants of ”other” milestones
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z
Age -0.009 -0.82
Early Stage 0.004 0.04
RAI 0.036 0.54
AI 0.004 0.12
Break Even 0.007 0.05
Aud. Balance Sheet -0.039 -0.33
Finished Product -0.001 -0.01
Reference Customers 0.043 0.42
Product Development -0.159 -1.94
Patents -0.100 -1.19 -0.175 -1.78 -0.179 -1.95 -0.179 -1.98 -0.085 -1.04
Independent VC 0.094 0.59 0.081 0.45 0.120 0.71 0.112 0.66 0.131 0.90
Public VC 0.118 0.59 0.236 1.02 0.280 1.21 0.261 1.13 0.135 0.67
Period 3 0.095 1.25 0.036 0.38 0.045 0.49 0.042 0.46 0.060 0.81
Growth Industries 0.053 0.52 0.048 0.47 0.041 0.41
Life Sciences -0.029 -0.22 -0.036 -0.27
Internet -0.046 -0.30 -0.044 -0.28
IT/Telecom 0.026 0.20 -0.002 -0.01
Trad. High-Tech -0.191 -1.56 -0.190 -1.63
No of Obs. 120 81 84 84 115
Wald /χ2 8.13 6.50 6.78 7.00 11.86
Prob. 0.5207 0.4824 0.3412 0.6369 0.2212
R2 0.0812 0.0744 0.0762 0.0795 0.1115
Log Likelihood -57.625 -40.843 -41.488 -41.338 -53.500
The determinants of milestone mixes
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z
Age 0.009 0.68
Early Stage -0.014 -0.09
RAI 0.122 1.44
AI 0.048 1.15
Break Even -0.082 -0.47
Aud. Balance Sheet 0.073 0.57
Finished Product 0.202 1.36
Reference Customers -0.072 -0.51
Product Development -0.043 -0.40
Patents 0.082 0.77 0.074 0.83 0.041 0.35 0.065 0.55 0.065 0.61
Independent VC 0.114 0.63 0.253 1.41 0.114 0.60 0.123 0.66 0.115 0.71
Public VC 0.158 0.76 0.265 1.13 0.071 0.32 0.078 0.35 0.151 0.77
Period 1 -0.288 -1.15 -0.201 -0.85 -0.210 -0.89 -0.219 -1.00 -0.262 -1.08
Period 3 -0.053 -0.54 -0.117 -1.26 -0.081 -0.71 -0.087 -0.76 -0.095 -0.97
Growth Industries 0.002 0.09 0.018 0.12 0.051 0.37
Life Sciences 0.152 0.87 0.114 0.70
Internet 0.390 1.98 0.349 1.80
IT/Telecom 0.273 1.70 0.271 1.72
Trad. High-Tech 0.458 2.58 0.376 2.18
No of Obs. 120 81 84 84 115
Wald /χ2 8.95 6.51 2.87 5.90 10.06
Prob. 0.5365 0.5900 0.8969 0.8236 0.4351
R2 0.0624 0.0537 0.0282 0.0514 0.0606
Log Likelihood -75.719 -49.996 -53.202 -51.933 -72.308
Notes: Probit regression with clustered standard errors at firm-level. Dependent variable is the dummy vari-
able OTHER MILESTONE (MILESTONE MIX) which takes value one when an other milestone (milestone
mix) is used with milestone financing and 0 otherwise. Marginal effects are indicated.
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Table 13: The Determinants between Pure Milestones, Pure Rounds and Mixes (1)
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Table 14: The Determinants between Pure Milestones, Pure Rounds and Mixes (2)
M
o
d
e
l
1
M
o
d
e
l
2
M
o
d
e
l
3
M
o
d
e
l
4
M
o
d
e
l
5
M
o
d
e
l
6
M
o
d
e
l
7
M
o
d
e
l
8
O
C
β
z
β
z
β
z
β
z
β
z
β
z
β
z
β
z
1
P
ro
d
u
c
t
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
-0
.9
2
3
-2
.4
8
M
a
rk
e
t
E
n
tr
y
0
.8
5
9
2
.7
4
A
I
0
.3
1
8
2
.3
0
B
re
a
k
E
v
e
n
0
.5
2
2
0
.9
7
A
u
d
.
B
a
la
n
c
e
S
h
e
e
t
0
.2
8
4
0
.6
1
F
in
is
h
e
d
P
ro
d
u
c
t
0
.2
6
5
0
.5
6
R
e
fe
re
n
c
e
C
u
st
o
m
e
rs
0
.3
3
4
0
.8
0
R
A
I
0
.5
6
2
1
.9
3
F
A
R
0
.4
2
3
1
.1
4
E
E
x
p
e
rt
-0
.8
5
9
-1
.9
6
E
B
S
1
.3
1
9
0
.9
7
O
u
ts
id
e
F
in
a
n
c
e
-0
.4
5
9
-1
.4
4
-0
.8
5
4
-2
.3
8
-0
.9
2
9
-2
.3
8
-0
.9
2
1
-2
.2
6
-0
.9
3
8
-2
.3
0
-0
.6
0
8
-1
.8
2
-0
.5
1
0
-1
.5
8
-0
.8
3
0
-2
.3
4
P
a
te
n
ts
-0
.4
2
0
-1
.1
4
-0
.4
3
5
-1
.2
1
-0
.4
0
9
-0
.9
4
-0
.4
0
7
-0
.9
5
-0
.5
8
2
-1
.2
9
-0
.3
5
4
-0
.9
5
-0
.3
6
6
-1
.0
3
-0
.2
1
1
-0
.5
1
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
C
-1
.0
8
9
-2
.1
7
-1
.0
4
7
-2
.0
6
-0
.8
6
4
-1
.4
0
-0
.8
4
0
-1
.3
6
-0
.7
0
4
-1
.0
5
-0
.9
5
8
-1
.7
8
-0
.9
1
4
-1
.7
8
-1
.0
9
2
-1
.9
6
P
u
b
li
c
V
C
-0
.0
0
3
-0
.0
1
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
4
-0
.1
5
3
-0
.2
0
-0
.1
2
9
-0
.1
7
-0
.1
3
0
-0
.1
6
0
.1
4
8
0
.2
4
0
.1
0
8
0
.1
8
0
.1
2
3
0
.1
9
P
e
ri
o
d
1
-0
.2
7
5
-0
.4
8
-0
.0
0
4
-0
.0
1
-0
.4
6
5
-0
.7
4
-0
.5
2
3
-0
.8
0
-0
.9
4
5
-1
.2
8
-0
.2
4
0
-0
.3
9
0
.0
6
6
0
.1
2
-0
.5
4
8
-0
.8
9
P
e
ri
o
d
3
0
.3
3
7
1
.0
7
0
.5
6
9
1
.7
0
0
.8
5
3
2
.3
3
0
.8
6
7
2
.3
1
0
.7
9
3
2
.1
7
0
.5
4
1
1
.7
2
0
.4
5
7
1
.4
3
0
.1
8
5
0
.5
1
L
if
e
S
c
ie
n
c
e
s
0
.9
4
3
1
.4
8
1
.2
8
6
2
.0
1
0
.8
6
8
0
.9
7
0
.8
0
2
0
.8
8
0
.9
2
9
1
.0
2
0
.6
7
6
1
.0
4
1
.1
7
5
1
.8
4
0
.7
9
5
1
.1
3
In
te
rn
e
t
0
.5
3
1
0
.8
2
0
.7
1
6
1
.0
8
0
.2
9
3
0
.3
1
0
.2
7
5
0
.2
6
-0
.1
6
8
-0
.1
7
0
.4
9
0
0
.7
5
0
.5
7
1
0
.9
0
0
.8
6
1
1
.2
5
IT
/
T
e
le
c
o
m
0
.5
7
0
1
.0
1
0
.8
0
2
1
.4
8
0
.4
9
0
0
.6
1
0
.4
1
6
0
.4
9
0
.5
2
2
0
.6
4
0
.2
2
3
0
.4
1
0
.6
4
8
1
.2
1
0
.8
5
4
1
.5
0
T
ra
d
.
H
ig
h
-T
e
c
h
0
.5
6
7
0
.9
3
0
.7
3
5
1
.2
3
0
.5
5
1
0
.6
4
0
.5
2
4
0
.5
8
0
.4
7
5
0
.5
4
0
.3
3
2
0
.5
5
0
.5
2
7
0
.8
8
0
.4
5
2
0
.7
1
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
0
.4
9
3
0
.7
3
-0
.3
9
0
-0
.5
6
-0
.3
6
7
-0
.3
6
-0
.3
3
3
-0
.3
1
-0
.3
2
9
-0
.3
2
0
.1
2
6
0
.1
7
0
.0
8
9
0
.1
3
-0
.9
0
1
-0
.6
4
3
P
ro
d
u
c
t
D
e
v
e
lo
p
m
e
n
t
-1
.0
5
1
-3
.3
4
M
a
rk
e
t
E
n
tr
y
0
.2
2
2
0
.7
8
A
I
0
.0
6
8
0
.5
3
B
re
a
k
E
v
e
n
0
.4
7
0
1
.0
3
A
u
d
.
B
a
la
n
c
e
S
h
e
e
t
-0
.4
1
0
-1
.1
7
F
in
is
h
e
d
P
ro
d
u
c
t
-0
.0
5
9
-0
.1
6
R
e
fe
re
n
c
e
C
u
st
o
m
e
rs
0
.4
5
4
1
.4
3
R
A
I
0
.1
6
2
0
.6
7
F
A
R
-0
.1
1
5
-0
.3
0
E
E
x
p
e
rt
-0
.4
9
2
-1
.2
0
E
B
S
0
.2
7
1
0
.3
2
O
u
ts
id
e
F
in
a
n
c
e
0
.2
8
6
1
.1
0
0
.1
1
7
0
.4
4
0
.0
9
1
0
.3
0
-0
.0
1
6
-0
.0
5
0
.1
8
9
0
.6
1
0
.2
2
7
0
.8
8
0
.1
4
4
0
.5
6
-0
.0
3
4
-0
.1
2
P
a
te
n
ts
-0
.2
0
2
-0
.6
3
-0
.3
9
2
-1
.2
8
-0
.6
9
0
-1
.8
5
-0
.7
1
3
-1
.9
9
-0
.6
0
4
-1
.6
5
-0
.2
9
8
-0
.9
9
-0
.0
9
1
-0
.3
0
-0
.2
8
7
-0
.8
4
In
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
C
-1
.0
8
9
-2
.3
3
-1
.0
2
2
-2
.1
9
-0
.7
6
1
-1
.4
0
-0
.8
2
5
-1
.4
8
-0
.8
0
5
-1
.4
1
-1
.0
7
5
-2
.2
6
-1
.1
1
0
-2
.4
0
-0
.9
5
8
-1
.9
9
P
u
b
li
c
V
C
-1
.2
9
1
-2
.3
5
-1
.1
0
3
-2
.0
4
-1
.3
8
1
-2
.2
2
-1
.5
2
6
-2
.4
1
-1
.3
0
2
-2
.0
4
-1
.0
6
3
-1
.9
7
-1
.2
0
2
-2
.2
5
-0
.7
9
0
-1
.3
3
P
e
ri
o
d
1
1
.2
7
4
2
.8
8
1
.3
4
2
2
.8
2
0
.9
7
2
1
.9
9
0
.9
6
6
2
.0
0
0
.9
1
8
1
.8
7
1
.3
4
7
2
.9
1
1
.3
6
4
2
.9
7
1
.0
1
4
1
.9
8
P
e
ri
o
d
3
-0
.5
2
1
-1
.7
3
-0
.5
3
4
-1
.7
1
-0
.3
6
0
-0
.9
6
-0
.2
6
0
-0
.6
8
-0
.3
9
1
-1
.0
2
-0
.3
9
9
-1
.3
5
-0
.4
9
1
-1
.6
7
-0
.6
4
5
-2
.0
0
L
if
e
S
c
ie
n
c
e
s
0
.2
0
9
0
.4
5
0
.5
9
1
1
.3
0
-0
.2
1
7
-0
.3
7
-0
.2
9
1
-0
.4
8
-0
.2
1
5
-0
.3
6
0
.4
4
1
0
.9
1
0
.5
4
5
1
.0
5
0
.6
3
3
1
.2
8
In
te
rn
e
t
0
.6
7
2
1
.4
3
0
.9
3
4
2
.0
9
0
.1
1
3
0
.1
8
-0
.0
7
3
-0
.1
1
0
.2
2
8
0
.3
5
0
.9
0
2
2
.0
1
0
.9
9
1
2
.2
2
0
.9
7
5
2
.0
6
IT
/
T
e
le
c
o
m
0
.2
4
9
0
.6
0
0
.5
8
1
1
.5
0
-0
.1
4
9
-0
.2
6
-0
.3
3
4
-0
.5
7
-0
.0
6
6
-0
.1
1
0
.4
4
7
1
.1
3
0
.6
4
9
1
.6
5
0
.9
3
5
2
.3
9
T
ra
d
.
H
ig
h
-T
e
c
h
-0
.0
6
9
-0
.1
5
0
.2
8
8
0
.6
2
-0
.1
7
4
-0
.2
9
-0
.2
5
8
-0
.4
3
-0
.2
2
6
-0
.3
7
0
.1
9
0
0
.4
0
0
.2
9
3
0
.6
3
0
.5
3
0
1
.0
6
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
1
.8
1
7
3
.5
8
1
.1
8
6
2
.2
6
1
.8
5
2
2
.4
6
2
.1
5
4
2
.8
1
1
.7
1
8
2
.3
5
1
.3
0
5
2
.5
2
1
.3
5
3
2
.7
3
0
.9
1
3
1
.0
1
N
o
o
f
O
b
s.
2
5
7
2
4
8
2
0
3
2
0
3
1
9
3
2
5
3
2
7
0
1
9
7
W
a
ld
/
χ
2
7
4
.9
6
6
0
.7
4
6
3
.3
5
7
3
.4
5
5
5
.5
0
5
3
.6
6
5
7
.6
7
4
9
.1
7
P
ro
b
.
>
χ
2
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
2
0
.0
0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
8
L
o
g
L
ik
e
li
h
o
o
d
-2
1
3
.8
5
5
-2
0
6
.7
4
9
-1
6
7
.3
7
9
-1
6
5
.3
5
6
-1
5
9
.9
7
8
-2
1
2
.2
1
2
-2
2
6
.1
8
5
-1
6
3
.5
2
7
N
o
te
s
:
M
u
lt
in
o
m
ia
l
p
ro
b
it
re
g
re
ss
io
n
w
it
h
cl
u
st
er
ed
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
t
fi
rm
-l
ev
el
.
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
th
e
ca
te
g
o
ri
a
l
v
a
ri
a
b
le
S
T
A
G
IN
G
C
A
T
E
G
O
R
IE
S
w
h
ic
h
ta
k
es
v
a
lu
e
o
n
e
w
h
en
p
u
re
m
il
es
to
n
e
fi
n
a
n
ci
n
g
ta
k
es
p
la
ce
,
v
a
lu
e
2
w
it
h
m
ix
es
a
n
d
v
a
lu
e
3
w
h
en
p
u
re
ro
u
n
d
fi
n
a
n
ci
n
g
o
cc
u
rs
.
T
h
e
ch
o
se
n
b
a
se
ca
te
g
o
ry
is
m
ix
es
.
T
h
e
co
m
p
a
ri
so
n
o
u
tc
o
m
e
ca
te
g
o
ry
(O
C
)
is
in
d
ic
a
te
d
in
th
e
fi
rs
t
co
lu
m
n
.
40
